Globalization and the States 

The first interpretation is that historically, transnational forces and the separate state have developed in tandem. In the past, the two have not been antagonistic and have indeed, depended upon each other. This emerges clearly in the works of historical sociologists pointed to the conjoint evolution of capitalism, transnational cultural forms, and the individuals nation state. These have always possessed a complex combination of relative autonomy and symbiotic interdependence.

There will be a restatement of the artificiality of the separation of state form from international structure.

Well as mentioned above, they believe that it is absurd to separate transnational forces with domestic forces. These forces are not antagonistic to each other. They say that it is absurd to say that all culture is unique and separate. They say that the individualized nation state, even nation state is the product of many ideas.

They say that change will be on the structure of international system.

- Anarchy.

- Hierarchy of states. 

System-state they do not believe that there would be demise of the state.

Globalization impinges not only on states and the system of which they are a part but also upon those specific political trades-offs between them that have done so much to shape the identities of both during the recent historical period.

To present globalization as treat to the state in isolation is then to miss the central point: what is destabilizes is not the state, but that particular accommodation between the domestic and international components of order.

Within the existing IR literature, there are typically two approaches to thinking about anarchy. The one operates from the inside out, and the other from the outside in.

Shift in the balance of power from security to economic major rulers have economic power. The strong states of the north have far imposed the heavier imprint upon it (globalization). 
 

The strength of the state 

In fact the domestic and the international cannot be so separated: they are essential parts of each other and it is the state that, politically, brings them together. In other words: if we are to develop a working concept of globalization, we must begin with an adequate theory of the state. In particular we must recognize that the state itself is not simply an out growth of the internal, but already reflects the presence of the external as well.

Fred. H observes “once the state is seen as institutionally distinct from society the question arises of the degree to which it can not autonomously and represent values separate from that society”. The claim driving from such notions is that if the state is free from domestic social forces, it can act strategically making independent decisions about what constitutes its interests. This autonomy has been described as either infrastructural or despotic. Both accounts regard autonomy as an aspect of the relationship between the state and its society.

We need to move towards recognition that the state as actor is not fully formed or complete prior to interaction; it only takes on the appearance of completion in interaction – interaction with other states, resulting in the social creation of the state system or for that matter of some of its supposed characteristics such as anarchy. However if the idea of the simultaneously inward and outward- looking state is taken seriously, it immediately becomes evident that there is a two fold process of interaction at work: “internally” with regard to society and “externally” with regards to other states and other actors. The formation of the state identity is by its very nature, bimodal and constitution takes place with respect to both.

What becomes an equally apparent is that state strength is paradoxically and confusingly used simultaneously as a measure of state separateness from society and of state closeness to society.

State strength (despotic) can be derived from the states separateness from society. Alternatively its strength (infrastructural) lies in its ability to penetrate its own civil society and to mobilize its skills and resources.

State strength is not inversely proportional to the weakness of civil society, but correlates positively with its resilience.

Already it can be seen that one element of the constitution of state identity is the engagement – internally with civil society. If that is true of the states identity in general, it is true of its strength in particular.

The other area in which the state finds its strength is within the social institutions of the state system itself. As generally noted the state is shared up from the outside by the panoplies of sovereignty equality and non-intervention. In the case of some of the weakest state of the south strength is mainly derived from this quarter in the absence of effective domestic sources of sustenance.

The modern state has always been part of a system of competing and mutually involved states.

In short there are several interconnected tendencies in the analysis of state strength. Some emphasize the externalist perspective within which state strength results from the social institutions of the state system itself, other prefer an internalist account which subdivides into two principal variants. Within this internalist category, the first it is benchmark of separateness. The second sees strength as proportional to the proximity of the states identity to that of society.

Well Holsti specifies strength as deriving from vertical and horizontal legitimacy – the vertical former centered on ideas of authority, consent and loyalty and the latter on definitions of the political community itself.

Holsti concludes “the relationship of the state strength to war however, is emerging: since 1945 most wars of all types have originated within and between weak states. Strong states have warred against the weak but not against each other.”

John G in his analysis of the economic future of Russia raises fundamental issues relevant to the foregoing commentary on state strength and its sources. His general contention is that in an age of globalization the main danger comes from the weakness of state: today human and social well being is being threatened chiefly by collapsed or enfeebled states. Nowhere is this more so than in the case of Russia which now has a form of government best described as “criminal syndicalism” until it has a strong effective state, he concludes Russia will not have a genuine market economy.

Russia needs to have democracy to strength its economy.

What does the state become?

·     Broker state- it permits both internal and external forces moving this state only redefine its roles and is basically a liberal compromise.

·     Embedded state- can use of globalization for its benefits symbiotic.

·     Globalized state.

Dear Student, this text is based on the class lectures of Professor S Pandit, Department of Politics & Public Administration, University of Pune. References can be found on the official site of Pune University, Department of Politics & Public Administration, subject of Globalization & State, Syllabus 2004-2009. This note prepared by Ahmad Reza Taheri (2004-2006). This note needs edition.